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REGULATORY TAKINGS: THE SUPREME COURT
ELIMINATES THE SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCES TEST FROM
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. ("Chevron") challenged a Hawaii
rent control statute as a compensable taking in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 2 The lower courts utilized the "substantially
advances" test, which states that a regulation is considered a taking if it
fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest.3 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the lower courts, holding that the
substantially advances test was no longer a valid method of identifying
compensable regulatory takings.4
The Court's decision to invalidate the substantially advances test
brings some clarity to a lingering source of confusion in the courts. Also,
the Court explains the holdings of previous "takings" decisions and
provides a summary of the appropriate tests that property owners may use
to challenge a government regulation as a compensable taking.5 This note
focuses on the reasoning behind the Court's decision, how the decision
affects future litigation, and most importantly, how the decision
strengthens private property rights.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1997, Chevron was the largest refiner of gasoline in Hawaii
controlling sixty percent of the market.6 Chevron sold most of its gasoline
through independent lessee-dealer stations that paid a monthly rent to
' 544 U.S. 528 (2005) [hereinafter "Lingle"].
2 Id. at 533.
3 Id. at 534-35.
4 Id. at 536.
sId. at 536-40.6 Id. at 532.
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Chevron.7 In June 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257 due to
concerns about the effects of market concentration on retail gas prices.
The objective of the statute was to "protect independent dealers by
imposing certain restrictions on the ownership and leasing of service
stations by oil companies." 9 Specifically, Act 257 capped the amount of
rent that oil companies such as Chevron could charge the lessee-dealers.' 0
Consequently, Chevron sued the Governor and Attorney General
of Hawaii (in their official capacity) thirty days after the enactment of Act
257 in federal court claiming that the statute's rent cap provision was a
taking of Chevron's property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution." The Court granted
summary judgment in favor of Chevron, holding that "Act 257 fail[ed] to
substantially advance a legitimate state interest," and thus constituted "an
unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments."' 2
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court's
application of the substantially advances test was the correct legal standard
to apply to Chevron's takings claim.' 3 However, the Court reversed and
remanded because there was still a genuine issue of material fact regarding
Act 257's benefit to consumers. 14 On remand, the trial court ruled in favor
of Chevron after both parties called competing economists to testify on the
economic effects of Act 257.15 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and held that
its prior decision "barred Hawaii from challenging the application of the
"substantially advances" test to Chevron's takings claim . . . ."" The
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded,
Id at 533.8 id
9Id.
1" Id.
1 Id at 534.
3 Id. at 535.
14
s Id. at 535-36.
6 1d. at 536.
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holding that the substantially advances test was not a valid method of
determining if a regulatory taking had occurred.' 7
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Substantially Advances Test
The Supreme Court has used the "substantially advances" language
throughout its takings jurisprudence.' 8 The Court first used the test over
25 years ago in Agins v. City of Tiburonl9 as the first prong of a two-
pronged takings test. In Agins, landowners claimed that a city's zoning
ordinance was an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 20 The Court held that the statute was valid and
did not constitute a compensable taking, and established the rule that
"[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a
" Id. at 545.
18 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 334 (2002) (noting that petitioner might have argued "that the moratoria did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest"); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monerey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999) (noting that jury instructions requiring "that a
regulation substantially advance legitimate public interest outside the context of required
dedications or exactions" was "consistent with our previous general discussions of
regulatory takings liability"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) ("a land-
use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state
interests and does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land"); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("a land-use exaction does not effect a
taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) ("a land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it
substantially advances legitimate state interests and does not deny an owner economically
viable use of his land"); U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126
(1985) ("the application of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a
taking only if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests");
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("the application of a general zoning
law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests").
'
9 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.20 Id. at 257.
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taking if the ordinance [1] does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests or [2] denies an owner economical viable use of his land." 21
B. Regulatory Takings
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that private
property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation."22
The rationale behind the government paying just compensation when
private property has been taken for public use is to prevent "[the]
[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which . .. should be borne by the public as a whole." 23
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon24 was one of the first cases where
the Court addressed regulatory takings. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice
Holmes reasoned that "'property may be regulated to a certain extent,
[but] if [the] regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 25
This reasoning laid the foundation for analyzing regulatory takings, but
provided little guidance to courts in determining what constitutes a
"taking." 26
C. Regulatory Takings Precedents
Loretto v. Telerompter Manhattan CATV Corp.2 7 and Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council2 both involved situations where the Court could
find a per se taking. In Loretto, a New York statute requiring that
landlords allow cable companies to install cable facilities in apartment
buildings was challenged as a compensable taking. 29 The Court held that a
physical invasion of property by the government, however small, requires
21 Id. at 260.
2 2 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536.
2 3 Id. at 537 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
24 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).26 d.
27 458 U.S. 419.
28 505 U.S. 1003.
29 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
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just compensation.3 o In Lucas, a landowner purchased two residential lots
that he intended to develop into residential housing. 3 The state later
passed a law which barred the landowner from erecting any permanent
habitable structures on the lots. 32 The landowner claimed that the law
diminished the value of his lots and resulted in a compensable regulatory
taking. 33 The Court held that a regulation that deprives a landowner of all
"economically beneficial use" may be considered a taking.34 Moreover,
the Court used the substantially advances language in Lucas by stating that
"the Fifth Amendment is violated when a land-use regulation does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land." 35
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission36 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard37 the Court created the "essential nexus" and "rough
proportionality" tests, respectively, to evaluate regulations that require
donations of private property as a condition of receiving a government
issued permit. However, the Court also used the "substantially advances"
language in both cases. 38 In Nollan, landowners brought suit to challenge
a condition on a government issued permit requiring the landowners to
grant the public an easement across their beachfront property.39 The Court
struck down the condition as unconstitutional utilizing the rule that a "land
use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances a
legitimate state interest . . . ."40 Justice Scalia reasoned that a regulation
substantially advances a state interest only if there is an "essential nexus"
between an exaction, and a state interest that the exaction is intended to
serve.41
'o Id. at 430.
3 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
32 Id. at 1007.
3 Id. at 1009.
34 Id. at 1027.
3 Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (emphasis
omitted).
36 483 U.S. 825.
3 512 U.S. 374.
38 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
39 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
40 Id. at 834.
4 1 Id. at 834, 837.
343
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No.2
Similarly, in Dolan, landowners brought suit to challenge a
condition on a government-issued permit requiring them to dedicate some
of their property for public use.42 Once again, the Court used the
substantially advances language in the decision,43 but created a somewhat
more stringent "rough proportionality" test." Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the exaction must be "roughly proportional" to the nature and extent
of the project's impact. 45 He explained that "the city must make some sort
of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." 46
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York ("Penn
Central"),4 7 the Court. created the "balancing test," which is used when
48
government regulations restrict the use of private property. In Penn
Central, New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law impeded
construction of any structure that would alter the character of the city's
historical landmarks and neighborhoods. 49 The Court created a multi-
factor balancing test which considers: (1) "[t]he economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant;" (2) "the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;" and (3) "the
character of the governmental action."50
The Court also used the substantially advances language in Penn
Central.51 The Court reasoned that "[t]he restrictions imposed are
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare .... ."52 The
Court also noted that a use restriction on real property may constitute a
taking "if [it is] not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose or ... if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the
owner's use of the property."53





47 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
48Id. at 124.
49Id. at 104.
s0 Id. at 124.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the Court first explained why the
substantially advances test is not a valid method of identifying regulatory
takings.5 4 Chevron argued "that the Takings Clause is meant 'to bar
[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which . . . should be borne by the public as a whole.'", However, the
Court explained that the substantially advances test "reveals nothing about
the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes
upon private property rights," or "how any regulatory burden is distributed
among property owners."56 Furthermore, this test does not help to identify
regulatory takings because it is not linked to the "text of the Takings
Clause[,] nor to the basic justification for allowing regulatory actions to be
challenged under the Clause."57
Next, the Court explained why the facts of this case illustrated the
"flaws in the 'substantially advances' theory."58 Based upon the facts, it
was unclear to the Court "how [much] Hawaii's rent cap actually
burden[ed] Chevron's property rights," especially when coupled with
Chevron's claim that it "would recoup any reductions in its rental income
by raising wholesale gasoline prices." 59 Therefore, Chevron failed to
establish "that it had been singled out to bear any particularly severe
regulatory burden." 60 The Court concluded that "Chevron . . . does not
seek compensation for a taking of its property for a legitimate public use,
but rather an injunction against the enforcement of a regulation that it
alleges to be fundamentally arbitrary and irrational."61
The Court then explained how the holding in the instant case does
not disturb any prior holdings. 62 While the substantially advances
language has been used in previous takings cases, the Court noted that in
54 Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
" Id. at 542.
56 id.
57 id.




62 Id. at 545.
345
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 14, No.2
no case did they find a taking based on this test.6 3 Ultimately, the Court
outlines three theories under which a claimant seeking to challenge a
government regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property
may proceed. These theories include alleging a "physical" taking, a "total
regulatory taking," or land-use exaction when the government requires a
person to donate pro erty to the public as a condition of obtaining a
development permit. For regulatory takings outside of these categories,
several other factors should be considered, such as "the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant," "the extent to which the regulation ...
interfere[s] with distinct investment-backed expectations," and the
"character of the government action."65
V. COMMENT
For nearly 25 years, courts have applied the substantially advances
test to determine whether a overnment regulation was an uncompensated
taking of private property. In announcing its decision in Lingle, the
6 1Id. at 546.
6Id. at 548.
5 Id. at 538-39.
6 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 334 (2002) (noting that petitioner might have argued "that the moratoria did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest"); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monerey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999) (noting that jury instructions requiring "that a
regulation substantially advance legitimate public interest outside the context of required
dedications or exactions" was "consistent with our previous general discussions of
regulatory takings liability"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) ("a land-
use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state
interests and does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land"); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("a land-use exaction does not effect a
taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) ("a land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it
substantially advances legitimate state interests and does not deny an owner economically
viable use of his land"); U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126
(1985) ("the application of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a
taking only if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests");
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("the application of a general zoning
law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests").
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Supreme Court eliminated the substantially advances test from takings
jurisprudence, curtailed some Lochner era litigation of state and federal
regulations in the lower courts, and most importantly, provided some
reassurance to property owners since the Kelo v. City of New London68
decision, where the Court expanded the governments ability to acquire
private property for "public use."
A. Was the Elimination of the Substantially Advances Test Necessary?
The Court should not have had to eliminate the substantially
advances test because it claimed to have never found a compensable
taking based on the test.6 9 The Court also claimed that "in most of the
cases reciting the 'substantially advances' [test], the Court merely
assumed [a statute's] validity when referring to it in dicta." 70 However, for
nearly 25 years, lower courts, litigants, and scholars have interpreted the
substantially advances formula as a component of a regulatory takings
analysis, and the Court has upheld the use of this test with its prior
holdings.7
67 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
68 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that a state may use its eminent domain power to transfer
property from one private party to another if the purpose of taking is future use by
public).
'Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
71 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 334 (2002) (noting that petitioner might have argued "that the moratoria did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest"); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monerey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999) (noting that jury instructions requiring "that a
regulation substantially advance legitimate public interest outside the context of required
dedications or exactions" was "consistent with our previous general discussions of
regulatory takings liability"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) ("a land-
use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state
interests and does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land"); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("a land-use exaction does not effect a
taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) ("a land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it
substantially advances legitimate state interests and does not deny an owner economically
viable use of his land"); U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126
(1985) ("the application of land-use regulations to a particular piece of property is a
347
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On the other hand, eliminating the substantially advances test for
regulatory takings should mitigate some of the confusion in the lower
courts. This was apparent in Lingle when the lower courts incorrectly
applied the substantially advances test, and as Justice O'Connor stated,
"took [it] to its logical conclusion, and in so doing, revealed its
imprecision."72 However, the Court has commonly used similar or
identical tests for various Constitutional Clauses and Amendments with
far less confusion.73 For example, strict scrutiny tests whether a
government action was necessary to advance a compelling state interest,
and narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.74 Courts apply this test to some
First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process claims.7 5 Using
similar or identical standards does not mean that the court has confused
the First Amendment with Equal Protection or Due Process.7 6
Nevertheless, in Lingle, the Court untangled due process and takings tests,
and consequently eliminated some of the confusion in lower courts when
analyzing regulatory takings.
Some argue that validating the application of the substantially
advances test to regulatory takings cases would signal a return to the
Lochner era.77 The Lochner era was characterized by courts determining
the viability of state and federal regulations, which as Justice O'Conner
states, is "a task for which courts are not well suited."7 8 Since the Lochner
era, the Court has generally held that judgments concerning the efficiency
of economic regulations are best left to the legislatures, not the courts, and
upholding the substantially advances test would welcome a flood of
economic litigation where courts would be asked to determine the
taking only if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests");
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("the application of a general zoning
law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests").
72 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
7 R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation that Fails to Substantially Advance





n Regulatory Takings - "Substantially Advances" Test, 119 HARV. L. REV. 297, 302-03.7nLingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
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economic viability of legislative acts. This was the case in Lingle where
competing economists testified as to the economic effects of Act 257 and
the court determined whether the challenged legislation substantially
advanced a legitimate governmental interest.79 Moreover, invalidating
legislative acts on economic grounds ignores the fact that the legislature
may have been pursuing a balance of social equity and economic
efficiency in their legislation.80
B. Strengthening Property Rights
Chevron's takings claim in Lingle did not concern land, but the
decision was a step forward in preserving property rights in a post-Kelo
America. Even though Kelo involved eminent domain and not a
regulatory taking, the Court's decision expanded the government's ability
to take private property for "public use." 82 This decision left many
property owners uneasy about this expansion in government power over
private property. Eliminating the substantially advances test gives property
owners more clarity and a higher level of predictability when challenging
costly regulations that diminish their property rights. Perhaps the criticism
and controversy surrounding the Kelo decision, coupled with the
subsequent expansion in government power over private property,
persuaded the Court to clarify its takings precedents and establish clearer,
more stringent tests to evaluate compensable regulatory takings.
In Lingle, the Court stated that there are three distinct situations
where a property owner could establish that a government regulation
resulted in a compensable taking.83 A property owner may proceed by
alleging "a 'physical' taking," a "total regulatory taking," or a "land-use
exaction" in exchange for some government benefit such as a building
permit.84 For regulatory takings outside of these categories, the court will
'
9 Id. at 535-36.
80 Regulatory Takings - "Substantially Advances" Test, 119 HARv. L. REv. 297, 303
(citing Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 371
(1986)).
8 See Kelo v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
82
1 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
4 Id
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consider other factors such as "the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant," "the extent to which the regulation . . . interfere[s] with
distinct investment-backed expectations," and the "character of the
government action."85
By eliminating the substantially advances test, the Court has taken
a significant step in building upon the reasoning in Pennsylvania Coal,
where Justice Holmes stated, "property may be regulated to a certain
extent, ut] if [the] regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." 6 The tests outlined in the preceding section clearly outline
situations where a regulation may go "too far." Also, unlike the
substantially advances test, these tests require an analysis of "the
magnitude [and] character of the burden a particular regulation imposes
upon private property rights," and "how [the] regulatory burden is
distributed among property owners."87
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision to eliminate the substantially advances test
from takings jurisprudence might not have been necessary, but the
decision provides guidance to lower courts in applying the law, and takes
some litigation regarding the viability of state and federal regulations that
affect private property out of the courts. Most importantly, the decision
strengthens property rights by bringing a higher level of clarity and
predictability to regulatory takings claims, which assists property owners
and government officials when regulations are challenged as compensable
takings.
DARRYL CHATMAN
81 Id. at 538-39.
86 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
" Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (emphasis omitted).
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